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International trade models typically assume 
that producers in one country trade directly 
with final consumers in another. In the real 
world, of course, trade can involve long chains 
of potentially independent actors who move 
goods through wholesale and retail distribution 
networks. These networks likely affect the mag-
nitude and nature of trade frictions and hence 
both the pattern of trade and its welfare gains. 
To promote further understanding of how goods 
move across borders, this paper examines the 
extent to which US exports and imports flow 
through wholesalers and retailers versus “pro-
ducing and consuming” firms. We highlight a 
number of stylized facts about these intermedi-
aries and show that their attributes can deviate 
 substantially from the portrait of trading firms 
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that has emerged from microdata in recent 
years.1
I. Data
Our results focus on 2002, but we note that 
results for other years are similar. We use the US 
Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction 
Database (LFTTD), which matches individ-
ual US trade transactions to US firms in the 
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD).2 For 
each export and import transaction, we observe 
the US-based firm engaging in the transaction, 
the ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) classifi-
cation of the product shipped, the value shipped, 
the shipment date, the destination or source 
country, and whether the transaction takes place 
at “arm’s length” or between “related parties.” 3 
For imports, we also observe an identifier for the 
foreign manufacturer or shipper, and we use this 
field to identify each importer’s number of for-
eign “partner firms.” Via the LBD, we observe 
firms’ employment according to the major indus-
try of each of its establishments. This informa-
tion allows us to compute the share of firms’ US 
employment across nine broad sectors, includ-
ing wholesale and retail (NAICS sectors 42 and 
44 to 45, respectively). Firms with only a single 
1 A longer version of this working paper is available in 
an online Appendix and from the authors’ Web sites. For 
theoretical explanations of intermediation see James E. 
Rauch and Joel Watson (2004), Bernardo Blum, Sebastian 
Claro, and Ig Horstmann (2008), Anders Akerman (2010), 
JaeBin Ahn, Amit Khandelwal, and Shang-Jin Wei (2010), 
Pol Antràs and Arnaud Costinot (2010) and Dimitra 
Petropoulou (2007).
2 We link 80 percent of transactions by value; see 
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) for more details.
3 Ownership thresholds for relatedness are ten percent 
(exports) and six percent (imports).
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US establishment necessarily have 100 percent 
employment in a single sector.
We distinguish between two categories of 
“pure” intermediaries: pure wholesalers (W), 
who have 100 percent of their US employment 
in wholesaling, and pure retailers (R), who 
have 100 percent of their US employment in 
retailing.4 We compare W and R to two other 
types of firms: “pure” producers or  consumers (PC), which have zero wholesale and retail 
employment, and “mixed” firms, which have 
wholesale plus retail employment between 0 
and 100 percent. We explore the ramifications 
of using a sharp 100 percent cutoff in defin-
ing W and R firms by further dividing mixed 
firms into “mixed wholesale-retail” (MWR) and 
“mixed producer-consumer” (MPC) according 
to whether wholesaling plus retailing in these 
firms accounts for more or less than 75 percent 
of employment. Together, W, R, PC, MWR, and 
MPC firms are mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive. Unfortunately, we cannot compare firms 
in the LFTTD to those which trade “indirectly” 
via wholesalers or retailers, as we do not observe 
the latter’s sales or purchases within the United 
States.
Table 1 reports a breakdown of trading firms 
and value by type of firm for 2002. Collectively, 
pure wholesalers and retailers account for 
4 Most—but not all—of the pure firms are single-
establishment firms. Firms with employment split between 
wholesale and retail are allocated to W or R according to 
whichever is higher.
large shares of trading firms but relatively lit-
tle value, with wholesalers being around four 
times more prevalent and responsible for con-
siderably more trade than retailers. PC firms 
are most numerous on the export side and as 
numerous as Ws on the import side and rep-
resent roughly one fifth of export and import 
value. Mixed firms are rarest but account for 
the majority of trade. This dominance is stron-
ger for exports than imports, though MWR 
importers are relatively more important for 
imports than for exports. The country compo-
sition of trade also varies substantially across 
firm types and between exports and imports, 
with trade with China accounting for by far the 
largest share of total trade for W, R, and MWR 
importers.5
II. Wholesaler and Retailer “Premia”
It is well known that trading firms differ from 
purely domestic firms along a number of dimen-
sions. Here, we demonstrate substantial hetero-
geneity within trading firms.
Table 2 reports non-PC firms’ “premia” rela-
tive to PC firms’ in 2002. Each cell reports the 
result of a different firm- (top panel) or firm-prod-
uct-country- (bottom panel) level OLS regression 
of the noted characteristic on a dummy variable 
5 See Emek Basker and Pham Hoang Van (2008a,b) for 
further evidence of the contribution of retailers to import 
growth from China.
Table 1—Distribution of Firm Types and the Trade Value 
 for Which They Account, 2002


























W 0.34 0.08 0.45 0.05 0.42 0.15 0.53 0.21
R 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.18 0.35
PC 0.52 0.22 0.58 0.03 0.40 0.21 0.56 0.07
MWR 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.30
MPC 0.04 0.67 0.60 0.04 0.04 0.55 0.55 0.06
Notes: First two columns of each panel report a breakdown of firms and the share of value for 
which they account; these columns sum to unity. Second two columns of each panel report the 
share of all US product-country cells in which each type of firm is present, and the share of 
trade value with China in total trade value for each firm type. Zeros are due to rounding. Data 
are for 2002.
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for the noted firm type. Each regression sample 
includes all firms of the noted type as well as PC 
firms. Regressions in the top panel include major 
six-digit HS category fixed effects as well as con-
trols for firm employment deciles (except in the 
first row). Regressions summarized in the bottom 
panel include product-country fixed effects and 
analogous controls for firm size.
Firm-level attributes considered in the top 
panel of Table 2 include domestic employment, 
total trade value, the number of country partners, 
the number of products traded and the number 
of foreign partner firms.6  Firm-product-country 
attributes considered in the bottom panel of 
the table include value, unit value (i.e., value 
6 The coefficient in the first cell of the top panel, for 
example, indicates that exporting wholesalers have on 
 average 60 percent (1 − e−0.91 ) of the employment of PC 
firms.
divided by quantity), and share of value with 
related parties.
Relative to PC firms, W and R exporters and 
importers have lower employment and, within 
size deciles, trade less value but trade more prod-
ucts per country.7 MWR exporters and import-
ers, in contrast, are substantially larger than 
PC firms: they trade more products, trade with 
more countries, trade more products per coun-
try and, on the import side, interact with more 
foreign partner firms, though only W importers 
trade with more foreign partners per product per 
country than PC firms. MPC firms are also rela-
tively large; they trade significantly more value 
at the product-country level than PC firms and 
7 Manipulation of the coefficients in Table 2 allows com-
parison of products per country and, on the import side, 
foreign firms per product per country.
Table 2—“Premia” Relative to PC Firms, 2002
Exporting firms Importing firms
W R MWR MPC W R MWR MPC
Firm-level OLs regressions
ln(Employment f) −0.91*** −0.80*** 2.67*** 2.76*** −1.16*** −0.96*** 2.80*** 2.77***
0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04
ln(Value f ) −0.02*** −0.02** 0.11*** 0.50*** 0.00 −0.01 0.29*** 0.35***
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
ln(Countries f) −0.01 −0.05*** 0.14*** 0.40*** −0.08*** 0.00 0.28*** 0.38***
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
ln(Products f) 0.06*** −0.02** 0.31*** 0.52*** 0.00 0.13*** 0.46*** 0.39***
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
ln(Partners f) na na na na 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.54*** 0.49***
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
ln(Mean PCGDP f) −0.13*** 0.02** 0.01 0.04*** −0.18*** −0.04** −0.05** 0.11***
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
Firm-product-country-level OLs regressions
ln(Value fpc) −0.09*** 0.00 −0.16*** 0.19*** 0.16*** −0.08*** 0.62*** 0.29***
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ln(Unit value fpc) −0.14*** −0.08*** −0.17*** −0.06*** −0.20*** 0.02** −0.03*** 0.03***
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ln(RP sharefpc) −0.83*** 0.61*** 4.08*** 10.58*** 3.44*** 1.63*** 0.14 7.06***
0.07 0.15 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.13
Notes: Each cell reports the results of a different OLS regression of noted characteristic on a dummy variable for noted firm 
type versus PC firms. Top- (bottom-) panel regressions include major six-digit HS category (product-country) fixed effects. 
All regressions except those in first row control for firm size (see text). Robust standard errors clustered according to the fixed 
effects are reported below coefficients. Data are for 2002.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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are substantially more likely to engage in trade 
with related parties. W, R, and MWR import-
ers all trade with countries with a lower average 
GDP per capita than PC firms do.
Results with respect to unit values are less 
clear. Perhaps intuitively, W, R, and MWR 
exporters have relatively low unit values within 
product-country cells and firm size deciles than 
either MPC or PC firms. On the other hand, 
while W and MWR importers have relatively 
low unit values, we find that R importers have 
relatively high unit values.
III. Product-Country Determinants of 
Intermediation
The third column of each panel in Table 1 
reveals that R and MWR firms participate in 
fewer product-country markets than W, PC, and 
MPC firms. Even among the latter, however, 
participation is well below 100 percent. In this 
section, we examine product and country char-
acteristics that influence market participation.
We correlate the share of trade value 
accounted for by each type of firm across prod-
ucts. As reported in our online Appendix, two 
features stand out. First, intermediaries’ corre-
lations with nonintermediaries are negative for 
both exports and imports, indicating these firms 
specialize in different sets of goods. Second, the 
shares of product trade due to PC versus MPC 
firms are also negatively correlated. This result 
suggests producer and consumer firms may 
develop in-house wholesaling or retailing capa-
bilities depending on the products they produce, 
or vice versa.
In our online Appendix, we report the share of 
export and import value accounted for by each 
type of firm across two-digit HS categories. Pure 
wholesalers tend to concentrate in agriculture-
related sectors such as Animal and Vegetable 
products in both exports and imports. PCs and 
MPCs, on the other hand, focus more on indus-
tries more likely to contain differentiated goods, 
such as Transportation. Among importers, we 
find that MWRs are disproportionately active in 
Textiles, Clothing, and Footwear. Correlations 
between the product value shares of exporters 
versus importers within firm types are positive 
and statistically significant.
Finally, as reported in our online Appendix, 
we find that the share of exports and imports 
mediated by pure wholesalers declines with 
market size, from 0.20 (0.25) for the smallest 
quintile of destination (source) markets to 0.07 (0.14) for the largest. Pure wholesalers therefore 
have relatively greater penetration of small mar-
kets, whereas for MPC firms we find the oppo-
site pattern.
IV. Gravity
A long line of research in international trade 
highlights the importance of “gravity” in deter-
mining trade flows. Here, we examine the role 
of country characteristics in influencing market 
participation by estimating gravity equations for 
each firm type.
Table 3 reports the results of two country-level 
OLS regressions. In the top panel, log aggregate 
trade value for each type of firm is regressed on 
partner countries’ log GDP and log great-circle 
distance from the United States (in km).8 In the 
second panel, the “extensive” component of 
log value, i.e., the log number of firm-product 
observations with positive trade, is regressed 
on these variables. The difference between the 
coefficients in the top and bottom panels is the 
contribution of the “intensive” component of log 
value, i.e., the log average value per firm-product 
observation with positive trade. Explicit results 
for the intensive margin, and for pure retailers, 
are available in our online Appendix.
Results for exports are straightforward: trade 
value falls with distance and rises with mar-
ket size. Moreover, gravity’s stronger effect on 
extensive versus intensive margins across the 
board is consistent with recent research on the 
margins of trade. Comparing the coefficient on 
GDP across columns, we find W trade is less 
sensitive to market size than MPC trade, con-
sistent with the former’s declining market share 
across GDP quintiles noted above. This differ-
ential response is disproportionately due to the 
intensive margin. The difference in coefficients 
on log GDP between MWR and MPC firms ver-
sus other types of firms is larger for the intensive 
margin than the extensive margin.
Results for imports are less conventional. 
While we find the expected positive relation-
ship between market size and import value, 
8 These data are from the World Bank and CEPII, 
respectively. The mean (standard deviation) of these vari-
ables are 25 (2) and 8 (0.7), respectively.
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distance has a negative and statistically sig-
nificant relationship with import value and the 
extensive margin only for PC and MPC firms. 
For intermediaries, the relationship is negative 
but statistically insignificant for Ws and positive 
but statistically insignificant for Rs and MWRs. 
One factor contributing to this result is the rela-
tively heavy concentration of Rs and MWRs in 
consumer goods (e.g., footwear) that are dispro-
portionately imported from far-away China, as 
reflected in the results reported in Tables 1 and 
2. Indeed, across two-digit HS categories, R 
and MWR importers’ value shares are strongly 
positively correlated with China’s import mar-
ket shares. Analogous correlations with respect 
to PC and MPC firms’ shares are statistically 
insignificant but negative.
V. Conclusions
Trading firms exhibit substantial hetero-
geneity and can be quite different from the 
“ stylized” trading firm emphasized in much 
of the recent literature in international trade. 
While pure wholesalers are relatively numerous, 
they are on average smaller than pure produc-
ers and account for a relatively small share of 
trade value. While pure wholesalers are concen-
trated in agriculture-related sectors, pure pro-
ducers and mixed firms are more prevalent in 
industries more likely to contain differentiated 
goods, such as transportation. Pure wholesalers 
are relatively less sensitive to market size and 
import disproportionately from China and other 
 low-wage countries. Together with differences 
in product specialization, this leads to depar-
tures on the import side from the standard grav-
ity equation predictions for trade.
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